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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 10-1063 
   
 
WILLIE GOODING, 
     Appellant 
    
v. 
 
JAMES WYNDER, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas; 
*SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
THOMAS CORBETT, Attorney General of Pennsylvania;  
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR YORK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
 
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. P.) 
 
     
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-07-cv-01243) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
     
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 27, 2011 
 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, 
 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 25, 2012) 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge
 
: 
  Willie Gooding appeals the District Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in relation to convictions for kidnapping and third degree murder.  We 
limit our review to the two issues on which the District Court granted certificates of 
appealability, and for the reasons explained below, we will affirm the denial of 
Gooding’s petition. 
I.  
 On November 7, 1996, Terrence Murphy, accompanied by two other men, 
attempted to rob a house in York, Pennsylvania, where Gooding and others engaged in 
illegal drug trafficking.  While fleeing the scene, Murphy fired shots at Charles Malloy, 
an associate of Gooding’s.  Though uncertain of the shooter’s identity, Gooding, Malloy 
and two other men - Antoine Brown and Corey Riera – speculated that Murphy and 
Arthur Irick, both known for robbing drug dealers, might have been involved and set out 
in search of them to retaliate.  They soon found Irick, and, thinking that he could be of 
use in locating Murphy, picked him up in one of their cars and continued their search.  
Irick directed them to an apartment building where he thought Murphy could be found, 
but he was not there.  At that point, the men drove to an isolated lot and forced Irick out 
of the car.  Malloy then shot him four times, killing him. 
BACKGROUND 
 Based upon evidence of the above presented at trial in Pennsylvania state court, 
Gooding was convicted, as an accomplice, for the kidnapping and third degree murder of 
Irick.  He was sentenced to the maximum 20-40 years imprisonment for third degree 
murder and the maximum 10-20 years imprisonment for kidnapping.  He was 
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unsuccessful in appealing his conviction in Pennsylvania state court and filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court.  That court denied the petition but 
granted certificates of appealability on two issues:  (1) whether the prosecutor’s conduct 
so infected the trial with unfairness as to deny Gooding due process and (2) whether 
Gooding was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by his attorney’s failure 
to request a jury instruction clarifying the limited purpose for which “other bad acts” 
evidence was admitted.  Gooding now raises these issues in his appeal to this Court. 
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Gooding’s petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 and our jurisdiction to hear his appeal is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253.  
Our review is plenary, so we scrutinize the state court determinations under the same 
standards as did the District Court.  Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Under those standards, a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by a federal court on a 
claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the adjudication (1) 
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  A claim is 
adjudicated “on the merits” when it is finally resolved based on its substance rather than 
on a procedural or other ground.  Thomas, 570 F.3d at 117.  When a claim before a 
federal habeas court has not been previously adjudicated “on the merits,” however, that 
court conducts de novo review over pure questions of law and mixed questions of law 
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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and fact.  Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009).  Regardless of how a claim was 
adjudicated in state court, that court’s relevant factual determinations are presumed 
correct, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 
III.  
A.  Due Process 
DISCUSSION 
 Gooding first argues that his due process rights were violated by repeated 
comments by the prosecutor that rendered his criminal trial fundamentally unfair.  He 
identifies 23 separate instances of such statements, made throughout the various stages of 
the trial, which generally portray drug dealers in a negative light, emphasize the fact that 
Gooding and his associates are drug dealers from New York City, and ascribe 
responsibility for many of the problems facing York to the illegal activities of these 
outsiders.  Gooding argues that these statements deprived him of a fair trial because their 
intent and effect were to cause the jury to conclude that he was a dangerous person and to 
convict him in order to address the problems in York. 
 Gooding is correct that prosecutorial misconduct can “so infect[] [a] trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).  This occurs, though, only if the misconduct 
constitutes a “failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of 
justice.”  Id. at 642.  Under our interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, determining 
whether this type of due process violation has occurred requires us to “examine the 
prosecutor’s offensive actions in context and in light of the entire trial, assessing the 
severity of the conduct, the effect of [any] curative instructions, and the quantum of 
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evidence against the defendant.”  Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 We agree with the District Court that the prosecutor’s statements connecting 
Gooding to drug trafficking were not improper.  Evidence that Gooding and his 
associates were involved in such activity served to establish a connection between the 
four of them and provided context and a motive for Irick’s kidnapping and murder.  The 
prosecutor’s references to Gooding’s drug dealing were therefore within bounds.   
We also agree that the prosecutor’s statements about crime in York in general, its 
association with outsiders from New York City, and the resulting implication that 
Gooding and his associates were responsible not merely for Irick’s murder but also for 
broader social problems in York were objectionable.  However, in the context of the 
entire trial, there were only a few isolated statements to this effect and they were made 
only tangentially to proper statements explaining the connection between Irick’s murder 
and drug trafficking.  We also note that the trial judge instructed the jury that statements 
of counsel were not evidence, thus minimizing any potential prejudice from these 
statements.  And perhaps most importantly, there was significant evidence of Gooding’s 
guilt.  Two of the other men involved in Irick’s murder, Brown and Riera, provided 
detailed testimony about Gooding’s role, thereby implicating him as an accomplice.  This 
testimony was consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the case and was corroborated 
by the testimony of other witnesses, such as Terrence Murphy.  The testimony was also 
supported by physical evidence, including a murder weapon found with Riera’s 
assistance that matched casings found at the crime scene.  Finally, there was evidence of 
a strong motive for the crimes.  In light of all this evidence, the fact that any 
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objectionable statements were not prominent in the context of the trial, and the general 
jury instruction that such statements were not evidence, we find that the prosecutor’s 
comments did not infect the trial with unfairness and thus did not render Gooding’s 
conviction a violation of his due process rights. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
As we have discussed, the prosecution’s evidence of Gooding’s engagement in 
drug trafficking was relevant because it explained the relation between the four 
assailants, their connection to Irick, and their motive for kidnapping and murdering him.  
Gooding argues, however, that such evidence could have led the jury to make improper 
inferences of his bad character and propensity to engage in crime, and that his attorney 
should have requested that the court give an instruction to the jury to prevent it from 
reaching these conclusions.  He claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to do 
so, thus depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
Pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, Gooding can make out a claim of 
constitutionally ineffective counsel only if he can demonstrate “(1) that counsel’s 
performance was deficient, that is, it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced [him].”  Albrecht v. Horn, 485 
F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-92 
(1984)).  To establish prejudice, Gooding must prove that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Even assuming that 
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the failure to request a limiting instruction in relation to evidence of Gooding’s 
engagement in drug trafficking was deficient performance by his attorney, we find that 
Gooding cannot succeed on this claim because he cannot establish that he was prejudiced.  
We reach this conclusion based on the strength of the evidence of Gooding’s guilt, which 
we are required to consider.  See Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 1999).  As 
we have described, such evidence was significant, including incriminating testimony 
provided by two of his fellow assailants, corroborating testimony by other witnesses, 
physical evidence, and strong evidence of motive.  Accordingly, we are confident that the 
outcome of Gooding’s trial would not have been different had his attorney requested a 
limiting instruction related to evidence of his drug trafficking, and we reject his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
III.  
 For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying 
Gooding’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
  
